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This paper takes a labor supply perspective (neoclassical labor supply, job search) to 
explain the lower employment rates of older workers and women. The basic rationale is 
that workers choose non-employed if their reservation wages are larger than the offered 
wages.  Whereas  the  offered  wages  depend  on  workers'  productivity  and  firms' 
decisions,  reservation  wages  are  largely  determined  by  workers'  endowments  and 
preferences for leisure.  To shed some empirical light on this issue, we use German 
survey  data  to  analyze  age  and  gender  differences  in  reservation  and  entry  wages, 
preferred and actual working hours, and satisfaction with leisure and work.    
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JEL classification: J14, J22, J64 1 
1.    Introduction  
An  empirical  observation  in  most  labor  markets  is  the  lower  (re-)employment 
probability of female and older workers. In Germany, employment rates decline with 
age after the maximum is reached at prime ages between 30 and 50 years for men and 
40 to 50 years for women (see Table 1). It can also be seen that women in all age 
categories  have  lower  employment  rates  than  men  and  that  this  employment  gap 
increases with age; this disadvantage may emerge during motherhood but still increases 
afterwards.  Non-employment  often  leads  to  individual  hardship  (e.g.,  lower 
consumption  standards)  and  is  also  associated  with  burdens  for  society,  because 
taxpayers have to finance unemployment benefits or early retirement schemes. In times 
of demographic change, it is a challenge for policy and Human Resource Management 
to activate the resources of female and older persons in the labor market to maintain a 
sufficiently large labor supply. Furthermore, demographic change has brought financial 
problems for public retirement schemes, so that many countries have recently increased 
the mandatory retirement age (e.g., in Germany from 65 to 67 years). However, it seems 
questionable if older workers still have the necessary employment prospects. Most of 
the political discussion focuses on labor demand side factors, i.e., if the productivity of 
older workers is still large enough for the wages paid, and assumes that old workers still 
want  to  work.  This  assumption  might  not  always  be  correct.  For  example,  we  can 
observe the active participation of workers in early retirement schemes. In this paper, 
we are going to explore age and gender differences in labor supply. More specifically, 
we  analyze  reservation  and  entry  wages,  preferred  and  actual  working  hours,  and 
satisfaction with leisure and jobs. 
  - insert Table 1 about here  2 
One stream of the literature in economics and industrial relations analyzes the labor 
demand side to explain age and gender specific employment gaps (e.g., discrimination, 
productivity and wages). Another stream of the literature looks at the labor supply side. 
The neoclassical standard textbook model of labor supply and the job search theory both 
assume that individuals only choose employment over non-employment if the offered 
wage is larger than the reservation wage. If women and older workers have on average a 
larger difference between reservation wages and offered wages compared with men and 
younger  workers,  the  employment  probability  of  women  and  older  workers  will  be 
lower. For example, age might have a stronger positive effect on reservation wages 
(e.g.,  due  to  higher  preference  for  leisure)  than  on  offered  wages  (e.g.,  due  to 
depreciation of human capital), which decreases the average employment probability of 
older workers. For women, one might expect that leisure preferences and reservation 
wages to increase during motherhood, whereas productivity and, consequently, offered 
wages are not positively affected. Because of human capital depreciation, employment 
interruptions may even lead to lower wage offers and therefore hamper the integration 
of women and especially mothers into the labor market.  
We  use  large  scale  household  panel  data  from  Germany  (GSOEP:  German  Socio-
Economic Panel) to analyze average age and gender differences in reservation wages, 
entry wages as proxy for offered wages, preferred and actual working hours, and leisure 
and job satisfaction. Our analyses focus primarily on the years 2007 and 2008, because 
these  are  the  only  years  for  which  we  can  compute  hourly  reservation  wages.  For 
working hours and satisfaction we can further apply panel estimation techniques for 
data from 1997 to 2008 as robustness checks. Previous research has mostly used weekly 
or  monthly  reservation  wages,  which  are  not  suitable  to  correctly  analyze  age  and 3 
gender  differences.  If,  for  example,  female  and  older  workers  prefer  to  work  fewer 
hours than men and younger workers, their weekly or monthly reservation income is, 
ceteris paribus, lower. This might even be the case if their hourly reservation wages are 
larger but not large enough to compensate for fewer working hours. In our empirical 
analysis, we find that older workers indeed have larger hourly reservation wages but 
lower  monthly  reservation  wages  due  to  their  preference  to  work  fewer  hours.  The 
estimated age effects are larger for women than men. We further find that the presence 
of  children  in  the  household  increases  reservation  wages  and  reduces  the  supplied 
working hours of women, whereas no significant effects are detected for men. Although 
our econometric analysis is largely descriptive, we find consistent evidence that older 
workers and mothers have higher preferences for leisure and higher reservation wages, 
which might explain the observed gaps in employment rates. 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes theoretical background 
from labor supply and job search models as well as previous empirical studies. Section 
3  describes  the  data,  variables  and  methods.  The  empirical  results  are  presented  in 
Section  4.  The  paper  concludes  with  a  summary  and  discussion  of  the  findings  in 
Section 5. 
 
2.    Theory and Previous Research on Reservation Wages 
2.1.  Neoclassical Labor Supply Model 
In this section we describe the standard neoclassical labor supply model (e.g., Borjas 
2009, Chapter 2). Each individual faces the problem of deciding whether to work or not. 4 
The decision to work is based on basic utility considerations. The individual optimizes 
the utility over consumption and leisure time. While more leisure raises the opportunity 
costs of losing income, more work raises the opportunity costs of leisure time. The 
utility  ( , ) U f C L =  is a function of consumption C  and leisure time L. The utility level 
U  can be shown in an indifference curve. A curve far apart from the origin represents a 
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.  Budget  constraint  deals  with  the  use  of  consumption.  The 
opportunities of consuming goods are equal to income. Consumption ( * C w h z = + ) 
depends on income with constant hourly market wages  w, working hours  h  and the 
non-working income  z . Because of a time restriction, the time budget  T  is a sum of 
working  time  and  leisure  time  (T h L = + ).  Bringing  together  the  parts,  the  budget 
constraint is defined in equation (1). The slope of the budget line is the negative of the 
wage rate ( w - ).   
( * ) * C w T z w L = + -           (1) 
Solving  the  optimization  problem,  an  interior  solution  and  two  corner  solutions  are 
possible. The corner solutions cover both extremes, to work all the time or not at all. 
Preferring  leisure  time  with  no  hours  of  work,  equation  (2)  defines  the  reservation 
wages 
R w  of the individual as the marginal rate of substitution at initial non-working 
income or wealth.  
R w MRS =               (2) 
In Figure 1 we show the point of intersection  y  of the budget line and the indifference 
curve for an individual who decides not to work. This is the endowment point, where 5 
the indifference curve has the slope of the lowest wage an individual would accept to 
work. The absolute value of the slope is the hourly reservation wage 
R w . Because of the 
non-working income  z , there is still a base level of consumption.  If the individual 
decides to give up one hour of leisure time, one can move up the budget line and get an 
income  w for consumption. Working all hours without any leisure time is equal to a 
maximum value for consumption ( * w T z + ). We can see that a general increase in non-
working income  z  would raise the level of reservation wages.  
  - insert Figure 1 about here     
Although  we  focus  here  on  non-employed  individuals,  there  are  different  effects  of 
increasing  wages  for  employed  and  non-employed  individuals.  For  a  non-working 
individual an increase in wages has no income effect. While higher wages make leisure 
more expensive, only a substitution effect is given. For a working individual an increase 
in market wages  w  has two different effects. While an income effect lowers the hours 
to work, the substitution effect increases them. It is not clear from the theory which of 
the contrary effects will dominate.  
In this paper, we assume that individuals are heterogeneous with respect to age and 
gender,  which  affects  reservation  wages  and  individual  labor  supply  decisions. 
Following several authors such as Lazear (1979; 1986), Heckman (1974) and Chang 
(1991), we interpret reservation wages as the shadow price of leisure. Lazear (1979) 
assumes already in his deferred compensation model that reservation wages increase 
with age. Heckman (1974), Lazear (1986), and Chang (1991) discuss different shapes of 
reservation wage profiles in the context of life cycle models and retirement decisions. 6 
Based on a traditional family model, men should offer more hours of working time than 
women. This may be explained by the necessity to earn additional household income for 
the family. For women we suppose differences between mothers and childless women. 
Non-mothers decide between leisure and working time, while mothers take additional 
time exposures into consideration to care for their children (Browning 1992). Therefore, 
mothers have a lower time budget they can allocate to market work. Moreover, mothers 
might have higher preferences for non-market work and leisure because they want to 
spend time with their children. Both considerations lead to a larger marginal rate of 
substitution between leisure time and consumption goods and, consequently, to higher 
reservation wages of mothers.   
Concerning age, we can propose the following considerations. Younger individuals are 
likely  to  have  lower  reservation  wages  than  the  older,  because  of  a  lower  level  of 
endowment with consumption goods. Older individuals, on the other hand, can lower 
their labor supply or even retire, because of a higher endowment with consumption 
goods. After a long duration of working time over the lifespan, they should have a 
higher level of non-market income or wealth and should have accumulated a stock of 
goods  (e.g.,  savings,  real  estate,  financial  assets,  greater  unemployment  benefit 
entitlement).  These  larger  endowments  should  lead  to  a  larger  marginal  rate  of 
substitution between leisure time and consumption goods for older individuals. It also 
seems  likely  that  older  individuals  have  higher  preference  for  leisure,  because  they 
might want to utilize their stock of accumulated goods and might be already exhausted 
from long working careers. Using the words of Gordon and Blinder (1980, p. 278), "(...) 
as  people  age,  their  preferences  may  shift  in  favor  of  leisure  and  against  work". 7 
Following these considerations, older individuals are likely to have higher reservation 
wages and, consequently, lower employment rates.    
 
2.2.  Job Search Models 
Referring to the 2010 winners of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel, we present a basic of-the-job search model (e.g., Cahuc and 
Zylberberg 2004, chapter 3). Here we will follow the influential works of Mortensen 
(1970) and McCall (1970). Surveys like those by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) or 
Rogerson et al. (2005) describe countless different model specific options like on-the-
job-search models, matching theories or labor market policy implications. For the case 
of elderly and gender specific aspects, we include additional considerations concerning 
the tendency. Search theories are modeled in an environment of economic uncertainty. 
We assume stationarity and continuity of time. The typical neoclassical matching of a 
job searcher and a job opening in an infinitesimally short period of time is not a realistic 
assumption. Here we allow for imperfect information on the labor market, regarding 
search  and  information  costs.  The  act  of  searching  is  sequential  and  unemployment 
benefits are paid over the whole duration of unemployment. A job searcher accepts the 
first offer when the offered wage is equal to or higher than his desired reservation wage 
R w . However, there is only one job offer in one period of time and,  once rejected, an 
offer is irreversibly lost. An non-employed job searcher is unsure of the exact wages 
that various firms offer. He only knows the wage distribution  ( ) F w  of wages  w. For 
the sake of simplicity, we assume a risk-neutral agent, so we are able to interpret the 
flows of income over time (dt ) as an expected utility. Furthermore, we include the 8 
possibility  0 q >  of losing a job after recruitment and a rate of interest r . Both of them 
are  exogenous  and  constant  over  time.  To  maximize  utility  over  time  we  include  a 
discount factor  1/(1 ) rdt + . By bringing together these assumptions, we start with a 
Bellman  equation,  the  discounted  expected  utility  of  an  employed  individual  ( e U ), 
considering the utility of remaining not employed ( u U ). 
  1
1 (1 ) e e u rdt U wdt qdt U qdtU +     = + - +       (3) 
By rearranging expression (3) and multiplying the denominator of the discount factor, 
we obtain equation (4). The discounted flow of income is added by a mean utility. 
    ( ) e u e rU w q U U = + -            (4) 
We express the discounted expected utility of an employed individual as  ( ) e U w . We 
rewrite the term (5). The gap between both types of utilities rises with higher wages and 
falls with the discounted utility of a non-employed individual.  
  ( )
u w rU
e u r q U w U
-
+ - =             (5) 
Following  the  restriction  that  only  a  single  wage  job  offer  can  be  inspected  in  one 
period of time, equation (6) shows that the reservation wages are equal to the discounted 
utility of a job searcher.  
 
R
u w rU =               (6) 
We turn towards the utility of a job offer (Ul ). It is the addition of two integrals over 
different values of utilities for both, the employed and the non-employed. In a basic 
model l  reflects the exogenous and constant job offer rate.  9 
 




u e w U U dF w U w dF w l
¥
= + ∫ ∫       (7) 
After the intermediate step, we present the utility of a non-employed job searcher  u U . 
The net non-working income  z  is the difference between unemployment compensation 
0 b >  and search costs  0 c > . The utility depends on  z  and the possibility of receiving a 
new job offer as described in (8).  
 
1
1 [ (1 ) ] u u rdt U zdt dtU dt U l l l + = + + -       (8) 
By rearranging the utility function, like equations (3) and (4), we get the discounted 
utility of a job searcher over time.  
  [ ( ) ] ( )
R u e u w rU z U w U dF w l
¥
= + - ∫         (9) 
As we focus on reservation wages, equation (10) allows us to assume the theoretical 
directions of the relevant variables for age and gender aspects. 
  ( ) ( )
R
R R
r q w w z w w dF w
l
¥
+ = + - ∫         (10) 
At  first,  public  transfers  b   have  positive  effects  on  reservation  wages 
R w .  Higher 
transfers raise the non-working income  z and lead ceteris paribus to higher reservation 
wages. Unemployment benefits  b  depend on payoffs from the last job. While wages 
increase over the lifespan, older individuals receive higher unemployment benefits and 
non-working income  z  rises as well. The reservation wages of older individuals are 
higher and the duration of search is longer. Women face on average lower transfers than 
men, because of a higher share in part-time employment with lower income. Here non-
working income  z  is smaller and female reservation wages are lower. Because mothers 10 
get additional child-related public compensation transfers  b , non-working income  z  
and,  consequently,  reservation  wages  are  higher.  This  leads  to  a  longer  duration  of 
search for mothers. 
Second, we assume that abilities to use modern information technologies and career 
networks can be different for older individuals and partly for women. Less access to 
formal and informal information concerning job offers reduces reservation wages. Men 
and women should have equal abilities for using information technologies. According to 
Schleife  (2006),  however,  older  people  have  poorer  computer  skills  than  younger 
people. They may face higher job search costs  c. Higher costs reduce non-working 
income z  and lead to declining reservation wages 
R w .  
Third, discrimination by firms may reduce the rate of job offers  l  for older workers 
and women. This leads to fewer job offers and to lower reservation wages 
R w . A fast 
sequence allows the job to search for longer, because of a high possibility of attracting 
higher wage offers, and vice versa. According to Hutchens (1988), older employees 
have a smaller range of career possibilities than younger people. Steiner (2001) shows 
that women may face discrimination because of maternity protections.   
The quantity and the quality of career networks can be influential on the job offer rate 
l . A larger network may lead to more contacts with firms and more job offers. A 
higher quality network should lead to better information concerning specific firms and 
their job openings and certain characteristics. Search costs should decline, because of a 
better matching quality and fewer contacts with firms. Cappellari and Tatsiramos (2010) 
show that both network effects exist. The number of employed friends increases the 
probability of re-employment. These jobs are better paid and have lower lay-off risks. 11 
We assume that the career network increases in the early years of working life and 
shrinks near the retirement age. So, older job searchers should have smaller networks 
than younger people. Women may have smaller network groups among the working 
population, as well. This may be the case especially for mothers.  
 
2.3.  Previous Empirical Findings 
A large part of the theoretical and empirical literature on reservation wages is concerned 
with macroeconomic aspects such as unemployment rates and public unemployment 
insurances  (Feldstein  and  Poterba  1984;  Shimer  and  Werning  2007;  Ljungqvist  and 
Sargent 2008), which are beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we summarize only 
selected empirical studies that are of special relevance for our paper (see Table 2).  
  - insert Table 2 about here 
Using U.S. data, Kiefer and Neumann (1979) show that reservation wages decline with 
duration of unemployment. Gordon and Blinder (1980) analyze the U.S Longitudinal 
Retirement History Survey for older men concerning their retirement decisions. Here 
age  and  health  play  a  central  role  for  reservation  wages.  While  reservation  wages 
increase by about four percent each year from the age of 58 to 65, ill health increases 
reservation wages by about seven percent. 
For data on Western German unemployment statistics, Franz (1982) presents a positive 
effect  of  public  unemployment  compensation  concerning  the  duration  of 
unemployment. Maani and Studenmund (1986) confirm a decline in reservation wages 
over unemployment duration for the case of unemployed Chilean men. Jones (1989) 12 
presents  for  Great  Britain  a  positive  effect  of  the  last  paid  wages  on  the  levels  of 
reservation  wages.  Women  have  lower  reservation  wages  than  men.  Schmidt  and 
Winkelmann (1993) use official unemployment data for Western Germany to show a 
positive effect on reservation wages for men, but no statistical significance for age and 
family  aspects.  Using  the  Dutch  Socio-Economic  Panel,  Gorter  and  Gorter  (1993) 
discuss for the Netherlands a positive relation between  education levels and age on 
reservation  wages.  With  the  same  dataset,  Bloemen  and  Stancanelli  (2001)  show  a 
positive effect of wealth on reservation wages. They assume a squared age function.  
Based on GSOEP data for Western Germany, Prasad (2001) finds that higher education 
raises reservation wages. Being married or having children lowers reservation wages. 
Because of a squared function for age, reservation wages rise in early years and decline 
around the age of forty. With the same data set Prasad (2004) shows that married men 
have higher reservation wages than married women. Children have a positive effect on 
reservation wages only for men, and not for women. Furthermore, there is no statistical 
influence  of  regional  or  nationwide  unemployment  rates  on  reservation  wages. 
Christensen  (2005)  uses  GSOEP  data  for  Western  Germany  to  show  that  average 
reservation wages are higher than the last market wages before non-employment. The 
results concerning age and gender are similar to Prasad (2004). Reservation wages do 
not decline with duration of unemployment. This finding is interpreted as a stationary 
level of reservation wages over time. Similar results are reported by Addison et al. 
(2009)  by  using  the  European  Community  Household  Panel.  Here  cross-country  
information is used to investigate a positive relation between unemployment insurance 
and reservation wages in thirteen countries. Most of them have reservation wages that 
are constant over the duration of non-employment. Pannenberg (2010) finds that on 13 
average unemployed individuals have higher risk aversion than the employed. By using 
GSOEP  data  for  Germany,  he  shows  that  risk  aversion  and  reservation  wages  are 
negatively correlated.  
Using  the  British  Household  Panel  Survey,  Brown  et  al.  (2010a)  compare  for  men 
weekly information about reservation wages and market wages. Both types of wages 
increase with age, but decline after the age of 55. With the same data, Brown et al. 
(2010b) find lower reservation wages among women, which is interpreted as a positive 
gender reservation wage gap. Effects of gender and family aspects such as motherhood 
explain parts of the gap. Constant et al. (2010) present an increase of hourly reservation 
wages between two generations of migrants in Germany. They use information from the 
IZA Evaluation Dataset to calculate a gap of 3.5 percent. Krueger and Mueller (2011) 
use a sample of unemployed individuals from the U.S. state of New Jersey to analyze 
job search. Here reservation wages are stable in younger and middle ages, but decline 
after the age of 50. 
Chan  and  Stevens  (2001)  show  for  U.S.  data  that  older  individuals  have  low 
probabilities of being re-employed after job loss. They compute a gap in employment 
rates of about 20 percent between displaced and non-displaced workers. While younger 
employees have a wide range of job opportunities, Hutchens (1988) reports that older 
employees are clustered into only a few sectors or professional fields. Gielen (2009) 
analyzes British micro data and shows that older workers prefer to reduce their working 
time. While men reduce their working hours and remain employed, women leave the 
labor market completely. This is interpreted as a need for more working time flexibility 
especially for women.  14 
Hunt (1995) and Steiner (2001) calculate hazard rates for Western Germany based on 
GSOEP  data.  Hunt  shows  that  an  increase  in  entitlement  to  unemployment 
compensation increases the duration of unemployment. Steiner argues that the older 
non-employed  and  women  with  young  children  have  lower  probabilities  of  being 
employed than young men or childless women. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) confirm 
the findings of Hunt and Steiner by using German employment data. They show an 
overall increase in duration of non-employment, but not for job searcher between two 
jobs. 
A review of the literature reveals that most authors use monthly information concerning 
reservation wages. We prefer the use of hourly information, because of a possible bias 
in the monthly variable. Unfortunately, only a few sources offer this information from 
the data. Gordon and Blinder (1980) calculate hourly reservation wages using wage 
information  out  of  the  Longitudinal  Retirement  History  Survey  (LRHS)  for  their 
analyses. As far as we know, only newer papers use hourly information. Bloemen and 
Stancanelli (2001) use data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) for the years 
1987 to 1990. Addison et al. (2009) use data of the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) for the years 1994 to 1999. Information concerning reservation wages is 
not always included for every country and every year. The German data, for example, 
are taken from special administrative data only for the years 1994 to 1996. Brown at al. 
(2010b) use hourly data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years 
1991 to 2007. A new source, the IZA Evaluation Dataset, is used by Constant et al. 
(2010).  Here  information  is  included  concerning  migration  aspects.  Krueger  and 
Mueller (2011) use hourly reservation wages from weekly interviews based on detailed 
administrative  unemployment  information  from  New  Jersey.  The  survey  covers  the 15 
period of 24 weeks from fall 2009 to spring 2010. The sources using the GSOEP data 
discussed  above  have  used  monthly  information,  whereas  we  focus  on  hourly 
information.  
 
3.  Data and Variables  
We use representative German household data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) (Wagner et al. 2007). Because of missing variables in some waves, the data 
set is limited to the waves from 1997 to 2008 with a special focus on the years 2007 and 
2008. The distinction between these samples is required because our main interest is in 
hourly reservation wages, which can only be computed for the years 2007 and 2008. As 
we are interested in non-employed and employed individuals, all pensioners, individuals 
in  military  or  community  service,  individuals  in  apprenticeships  or  trainings,  self-
employed  or  freelancers,  and  individuals  working  in  family  businesses  have  been 
excluded from the data. Two estimation samples are used: a cross-section for the two 
years of 2007 and 2008 and a longer unbalanced panel from 1997 to 2008, for which 
panel estimates are performed as robustness checks to reduce time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. The short sample includes 3812 observations of 3022 individuals, with 
1905  observations  of  1522  non-employed  individuals  concerning  reservation  wages 
(617  men  and  905  women)  and  1907  observations  of  1757  employed  individuals 
concerning entry wages (819 men and 938 women). The long sample includes a total of 
101500 observations of 20712 individuals (10733 men and 9979 women).  
In our empirical analysis we are going to compare the results from regressions for log 
hourly reservation wages and log hourly entry wages to obtain insights into age and 16 
gender differences as potential explanations for differences in observed employment 
rates. We further compare these results with estimates for log monthly reservation and 
entry wages in order to evaluate a potential specification bias that might lead to wrong 
conclusions. Additional regressions for preferred and actual working hours, leisure and 
job satisfaction are estimated to analyze if differences in preferences for leisure relative 
to  work  might  be  the  reason  for  age  and  gender  differences  in  reservation  wages. 
Equation  (11)  presents  the  basic  estimation  framework,  in  which  it Y   represents  the 
different dependent variables, mentioned above, for individual  i in year  t. The main 
explanatory variables of interest are age groups (18-25 as reference, 26-35, 36-45, 46-
55, 56-65) with coefficients a .  it X  denotes a vector of additional explanatory variables 
with the coefficients b .  it e  is the usual remaining error term. A list of the variables and 
short descriptions are displayed in Table 3. Descriptive statistics for all sub-samples can 
be found in Appendix A (Tables A.1 to A.12). 
  1 2 2, 3 3, 4 4, 5 5, it it it it it it it Y Age Age Age Age X a a a a a b e = + + + + + +     (11) 
  - insert Table 3 about here 
Reservation wages are asked about in the GSOEP questionnaire in this way: "How high 
would your net income or salary have to be for you to take a position offered to you?". 
This question is asked to individuals without paid employment, but who intend to be 
engaged in paid employment in the near future. To get hourly information we use a 
question concerning the desired working hours of the unemployed, which is included in 
the survey since 2007: "In your opinion how many hours a week would you have to 
work  to  earn  this  net  income?".  Entry  wages  are  calculated  only  for  employed 
individuals  with  less  than  one  year  of  tenure.  For  all  wage  variables  we  take  the 17 
logarithm. Because of implausible interpretation, we drop all observations with wages 
below one Euro. 
Concerning the working time aspects, we compare desired and actual working hours. 
For job searchers we have information about their desired hours only in 2007 and 2008, 
while  we  know  these  for  employed  individuals  over  the  long  sample  as  well.  For 
employed individuals we are able to compare the desired with the actual working time. 
To  analyze  possible  effects  of  shifting  preferences,  we  perform  regressions  for 
satisfaction  with  leisure  and  job.  While  job  satisfaction  is  only  given  for  employed 
individuals, satisfaction with leisure is available for everyone. All types of satisfaction 
variables use a likert scale of ascending order from 0 to 10. 
As explanatory variables we use a set of socioeconomic determinants. We focus on age 
and  gender  aspects  and  the  influence  of  children  on  labor  supply.  Additionally  we 
control for household income, education, state of health, German citizenship, regional 
unemployment  rate,  years,  and  federal  states.  The  sample  is  limited  to  observations 
between 18 and 65 years. The age of 18 is the German age of legal majority and 65 is 
the legal retirement age. We use five age groups (18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65) to 
allow for non-linear age effects. The variable “female” is a dummy for women. Another 
dummy variable controls for the presence of children under the  age of sixteen in a 
household. The household income is used as the logarithm of the adjusted monthly net 
household income. This is a proxy for non-working income and wealth. To control for 
education  we  include  secondary  schooling  degrees,  vocational  and  college  degrees. 
“Schooling”  is  encoded  into  three  characteristics  of  lowest,  intermediate,  and  upper 
school degree. “Vocational” and “university” are dummy variables for the respective 
degrees. The subjective state of health is measured in the variable “health” with three 18 
categories:  good,  normal,  and  bad.  The  variable  “German”  controls  for  German 
citizenship. In the regressions concerning satisfaction with leisure and work, we control 
additionally for the overall life satisfaction. 
The regional unemployment rate
1 in the month of the interview is included to control 
for state and month specific differences in labor market conditions. Because of regional 
aggregations in the GSOEP data, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland is treated as one 
state. Here we use information in the regional directorate of the Federal Employment 
Agency. To control for further regional differences, we include dummy variables for all 
German federal states.  
 
4.  Empirical Results  
4.1.  Reservation and Entry Wages 
In the first part of our empirical analysis, we estimate log-linear earnings functions in 
order  to  evaluate  age  and  gender  differences  in  reservation  and  entry  wages.  Since 
information about working hours for stated monthly reservation income is not available 
before the year 2007, we can only make use of the waves 2007 and 2008. Due to the 
fact that reservation wages are only reported in the case of non-employment and that 
entry  wages  (wages  if  tenure  is  less  than  one  year)  only  occur  at  the  start  of  an 
employment relationship, we estimate cross section OLS regressions. At first, we will 
turn to our main results for hourly reservation and entry wages. Afterwards, we will 
                                                 
1 This information is taken from a long time-series of German federal unemployment statistics, which is 
published on the homepages of the German Federal Statistical Office. 19 
estimate further regressions for monthly reservation and entry wages to show that the 
monthly information is unsuitable for many topics, as the results can lead to wrong 
conclusions.  
The regression results for log hourly reservation and entry wages are displayed in Table 
4. The first two columns comprise the results for the complete sample. It can be seen 
that hourly reservation and entry wages increase with age, but that the age effect on 
reservation wages is greater than on entry wages. This finding is consistent with our 
consideration that older workers may remain voluntarily non-employed because their 
reservation wages are larger than the potential offered wages for which our entry wages 
serve as proxies. Women have on average about 6 percent lower reservation wages than 
men. As the entry wages of women are even lower (by approximately 13 percent), the 
gap  between  reservation  and  entry  wages  is  larger  for  women,  which  might  partly 
explain  the  gender  gap  in  employment  rates.  The  results  further  indicate  a  positive 
correlation between reservation and entry wages, on the one side, and the presence of 
children in the household, education, good health, and household income, on the other 
side. 
  - insert Table 4 about here 
Due  to  significant  gender  differences  in  the  determinants  of  reservation  and  entry 
wages,  our  further  discussion  focuses  on  separate  estimates  for  men  and  women. 
Columns  three  and  four  include  the  results  for  men  and  columns  five  and  six  for 
women. The reservation wages of men do not significantly differ between age groups 
from 26 to 55 years but are significantly larger for men older than 55 years. Entry wages 
for older male workers increase by about the same amount. The results for women are 20 
quite different. Whereas their reservation wages strongly increase with age, their entry 
wages do not. An explanation for this finding may be that the age effects on preferences 
towards leisure and consumption do not significantly differ between men and women, 
which  will  lead  to  small  differences  in  the  age  effects  on  reservation  wages.  Entry 
wages, on the other hand, depend strongly on productivity, which is positively affected 
by  on-the-job  training  and  negatively  by  employment  interruptions  (depreciation  of 
human  capital).  Since  women  have  more  frequently  interrupted  employment 
biographies than men (due to, e.g., family responsibilities), their entry wages on average 
do not increase with age as is the case for men. From our findings, it follows that the 
increasing with age gender gap in employment rates might be a result of the increasing 
with age gender gap in the difference between reservation and entry wages. 
Another  interesting  gender  difference  in  the  determinants  of  reservation  and  entry 
wages is the effect of the presence of children in the household. Whereas children have 
no effect on the reservation wages of men, they have significant positive effects on the 
reservation  wages  of  women.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  our  theoretical 
consideration that mothers have a lower time budget, from which time can be allocated 
to market work, and higher preferences for leisure in order to care for their children. 
From  both  arguments,  there  follows  a  larger  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between 
leisure and consumption and, hence, larger reservation wages for mothers. Fathers are 
also likely to have preferences for spending time with their children, which will increase 
their reservation wages. But to compensate the potential losses of mothers' income and 
to generate additional income for the children, fathers may have to search for jobs with 
higher  intensity  and  reduce  their  reservation  wages  (Browning  1992,  p.  1452).  We 
further find that children have a positive effect on male entry wages but not on female 21 
entry wages. Although this finding might seem interesting at first glance, we attribute it 
largely to institutional arrangements of tax reductions and family subsidies, which are 
usually accounted for on the primary household earner's payroll. The overall results 
point to the dominance of the conservative family model, where the mother is concerned 
with family work and the father with market work.   
To sum up our first piece of empirical evidence, the overall results indicate that women 
and especially mothers and older women have higher reservation wages but not higher 
entry wages. From this it follows that these groups have lower probabilities of choosing 
employment over non-employment, which might explain their lower employment rates. 
In the next step, we re-estimate the previous regressions using log monthly reservation 
and entry wages instead of hourly wages. Although most previous studies have used 
monthly reservation wages instead of hourly reservation wages, a conceptual problem 
arises.  Because  monthly  reservation  wages  include  also  the  preferred  number  of 
working  hours  which  are  likely  to  be  influenced  by  the  same  variables  but  not 
necessarily  in  the  same  direction,  estimates  are  likely  to  be  systematically  biased 
leading to wrong conclusions and policy recommendations. If compared to the results 
for hourly wages in Table 4, the results for monthly reservation and entry wages in 
Table 5 illustrate such wrong conclusions. For example, age has negative effects on 
monthly  reservation and entry wages and the presence of children  reduces women's 
monthly reservation wages. The reason for these findings are, however, not negative 
effects on hourly reservation and entry wages but negative effects on working hours. 
Moreover, the gender gaps in reservation and entry wages are substantially larger for 
monthly than hourly data because women prefer to work on average fewer hours. That 22 
such biased results  are  the outcome of systematic effects on working  hours will be 
illustrated in the next section. 
  - insert Table 5 about here 
 
4.2.  Preferred and Actual Working Hours 
In order to validate our statements from the previous section about the effects of age, 
gender, and presence of children on working hours, we estimate linear regressions for 
three outcome variables in the years 2007 and 2008: (1) preferred weekly working hours 
by non-employed job searchers, (2) preferred weekly working hours by those who have 
started a new job within the last year, and (3) actual weekly working hours by those 
who  have  started  a  new  job  within  the  last  year.  The  results  in  Table  6  show  that 
preferred and actual working hours decrease with age and that the age effect is stronger 
for women than men. We further find that women prefer on average to work fewer 
hours and actually work fewer hours than men. Women with children in the household 
prefer to work fewer hours and actually do so, whereas the presence of children does not 
significantly affect the labor supply of men (Browning 1992). 
  - insert Table 6 about here 
For preferred weekly working hours and actual weekly working hours by those who are 
employed,  we  have  longitudinal  information  and  can  apply  panel  estimates  for  the 
observation  period  1997  to  2008  to  reduce  problems  stemming  from  unobserved 
heterogeneity. We have estimated random effects and fixed effects linear models, in 
which the individual effects are jointly significant. Although the results between the 23 
models do not differ qualitatively, Hausman specification tests reject the null hypothesis 
of no systematic differences between random and fixed models. As the results from the 
panel estimates support in general our previous results from the cross-sections for 2007 
and 2008, the estimation output is only displayed in Appendix B (Tables B.1 and B.2). 
The overall findings in this section indicate that women, and especially mothers as well 
as older workers, voluntarily reduce their labor supply, which might be interpreted as 
the outcome of greater preferences for leisure. 
   
4.3.  Satisfaction with Leisure and Job 
According to the labor  supply model discussed in the theory section,  differences in 
reservation wages as well as in preferred and actual working hours might be an outcome 
of  leisure  preferences.  Therefore,  we  analyze  the  effect  of  age  on  satisfaction  with 
leisure and job satisfaction. Happiness research in economics has received increasing 
attention  in  recent  years.  Frey  and  Stutzer  (2002)  found  that  satisfaction  is  at  least 
somehow related to the utility concept. Our purpose is to use the information about 
satisfaction in the for us relevant domains of leisure and work in order to analyze if 
systematic age differences exists. From a ceteris paribus perspective, such systematic 
differences are likely to indicate preference changes with age, because we control for 
household income as proxy for the endowment with wealth. In order to reduce further 
individual heterogeneity in the estimates, we include a control variable for general life 
satisfaction. We again use linear regressions for the cross-sections for 2007 and 2008 
(see Table 7) and random and fixed effects linear models for the years 1997 to 2008 (see 
Table B.3 and Table B.4 in Appendix B).  24 
The main consistently estimated result is that older individuals are on average happier 
with their leisure but not with their jobs; and that this age effect is stronger for women 
than men. Our finding can be interpreted as an increasing with age preference for leisure 
relative  to  work  (e.g.,  Gordon  and  Blinder  1980),  which  may  explain  the  higher 
reservation wages and lower labor supply that result in the lower employment rates of 
older workers - especially older women. 
  - insert Table 7 about here 
 
5.  Conclusion  
In  times  of  demographic  change,  it  is  a  challenge  for  policy  and  Human  Resource 
Management to activate the resources of female and older persons in the labor market to 
maintain a sufficiently large labor supply and to reduce financial problems in retirement 
schemes.  Such  an  activation  strategy  is  motivated  by  the  empirical  observation  that 
employment rates decrease with age among the elderly and are lower for women than 
for men. Much political concern focuses on the employer side and leads to appeals to 
recruit more women and older workers. Without neglecting the fact that discrimination 
is an important issue, our paper has taken the opposite view and has found empirical 
support for labor supply side explanations of differences in employment rates. From a 
theoretical perspective (neoclassical labor supply model, job search models) individuals 
voluntarily  choose  non-employment  over  employment  if  their  reservation  wages  are 
larger than the wages offered by firms. We have indeed found empirical evidence that 
hourly reservation wages increase with age for men and women. However, hourly entry 25 
wages as proxy for offered wages increase with age only for men and not for women, 
which may partly explain the with age increasing gender gap in employment rates.  
As a methodological contribution, we can show that the specification of the reservation 
wage as an hourly variable instead of a monthly variable yields more plausible results, 
because age  and  gender have simultaneous effects on hourly  reservation wages and 
preferred working hours. Older workers and women prefer to work fewer hours and 
actually do so. In combination with the result that satisfaction with leisure increases 
relatively to job satisfaction, our findings support the statement of Gordon and Blinder 
(1980, p. 278) that "(...) as people age, their preferences may shift in favor of leisure and 
against work". Consequently, the lower employment rates of women and older persons 
can be partly attributed to the labor supply side and not necessarily to the labor demand 
side. From this it follows, first, that the productivity of women and older workers needs 
to  be  increased  so  that  they  can  get  higher  wage  offers  by  firms.  Special  training 
programs inside and outside firms, which are targeted at older persons and especially 
women,  might  help  to  maintain  or  even  increase  productivity  and  employability. 
Second, policy could subsidize employment and especially reintegration into the labor 
market (e.g., direct transfers, tax reductions), which would also increase offered wages 
and the employment probability.  
Furthermore,  we  have  found  gender-specific  differences  in  the  family  context.  The 
presence of children in the household has positive effects on the reservation wages of 
women and negative effects on their labor supply, whereas neither reservation wages 
nor  working  hours  of  men  are  significantly  affected.  These  findings  point  to  the 
dominance  of  the  traditional  family  model  in  Germany  that  mothers  bear  the  main 
responsibility  for  raising  children  -  voluntarily  or  involuntarily.  In  order  to  activate 26 
more  mothers  for  the  labor  market,  firms  as  well  as  policy  should  continue  the 
expansion of more flexible working time schedules and day care for children at the 
workplace and in the close neighborhood. Especially for Germany, additional full-time 
school programs might help parents to reduce time restrictions.  
 27 
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics (Online-Appendix, for Reviewer) 
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for different samples (2007/2008): all (not-employed, employed), men and women  
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Reservation Wages hourly  1905  2.028  0.438  0.163  4.075 
Reservation Wages monthly  1905  6.895  0.532  3.912  9.210 
Entry Wages hourly  1907  1.884  0.503  0.022  4.420 
Entry Wages monthly  1907  6.748  0.771  3.296  9.798 
Desired Working Hours  1905  33.425  11.415  2  80 
Desired Working Hours  1907  34.035  11.261  0  75 
Actual Working Hours  1907  35.0142  14.8537  1  77 
Leisure Satisfaction  3812  6.654  2.239  0  10 
Job Satisfaction  2256  6.592  2.602  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  3812  6.626  1.974  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  3812  0.282  0.450  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  3812  0.256  0.436  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  3812  0.176  0.381  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  3812  0.064  0.244  0  1 
Intermediate School  3812  0.353  0.478  0  1 
Upper School  3812  0.274  0.446  0  1 
Vocational Degree  3812  0.639  0.480  0  1 
College Degree  3812  0.159  0.366  0  1 
Health: normal  3812  0.287  0.453  0  1 
Health: bad  3812  0.131  0.337  0  1 
Household Income  3812  7.651  0.631  5.037  10.309 
Female  3812  0.562  0.496  0  1 
Children  3812  0.437  0.496  0  1 32 
German  3812  0.927  0.260  0  1 
Year 2008  3812  0.472  0.499  0  1 
Federal States  3812  8.082  3.774  1  15 













Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for different samples (2007/2008): all (not-employed, employed), men  
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Reservation Wages hourly  780  2.0346  0.4427  0.5680  4.0745 
Reservation Wages monthly  780  7.1036  0.4835  4.6052  9.2102 
Entry Wages hourly  888  1.9330  0.5267  0.0225  4.2569 
Entry Wages monthly  888  7.0412  0.7184  3.8712  9.7981 
Desired Working Hours  780  38.8718  8.4303  6  70 
Desired Working Hours  888  39.2095  9.0865  0  75 
Actual Working Hours  888  41.8833  12.6829  2  77 
Leisure Satisfaction  1668  6.6493  2.2130  0  10 
Job Satisfaction  1049  6.4433  2.6603  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  1668  6.4197  2.0413  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  1668  0.2716  0.4449  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  1668  0.2200  0.4144  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  1668  0.1829  0.3867  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  1668  0.0923  0.2896  0  1 
Intermediate School  1668  0.3171  0.4655  0  1 
Upper School  1668  0.2554  0.4362  0  1 
Vocational Degree  1668  0.6379  0.4808  0  1 
College Degree  1668  0.1451  0.3523  0  1 
Health: normal  1668  0.2776  0.4479  0  1 
Health: bad  1668  0.1283  0.3345  0  1 
Household Income  1668  7.6030  0.6537  5.2983  10.3090 
Children  1668  0.3261  0.4689  0  1 
German  1668  0.9173  0.2756  0  1 
Year 2008  1668  0.4622  0.4987  0  1 
Federal States  1668  8.3999  3.8051  1  15 34 














Table A.3: Descriptive statistics for different samples (2007/2008): all (not-employed, employed), women  
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Reservation Wages hourly  1125  2.0238  0.4352  0.1625  4.0745 
Reservation Wages monthly  1125  6.7503  0.5158  3.9120  8.2940 
Entry Wages hourly  1019  1.8419  0.4770  0.0572  4.4205 
Entry Wages monthly  1019  6.4927  0.7241  3.2958  8.2687 
Desired Working Hours  1125  29.6489  11.6880  2  80 
Desired Working Hours  1019  29.5265  11.0364  0  60 
Actual Working Hours  1019  29.0282  13.9965  1  75 
Leisure Satisfaction  2144  6.6576  2.2587  0  10 
Job Satisfaction  1207  6.7216  2.5439  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  2144  6.7864  1.9051  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  2144  0.2906  0.4541  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  2144  0.2840  0.4511  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  2144  0.1712  0.3768  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  2144  0.0415  0.1995  0  1 
Intermediate School  2144  0.3811  0.4858  0  1 
Upper School  2144  0.2887  0.4533  0  1 
Vocational Degree  2144  0.6390  0.4804  0  1 
College Degree  2144  0.1702  0.3759  0  1 
Health: normal  2144  0.2948  0.4560  0  1 
Health: bad  2144  0.1329  0.3396  0  1 
Household Income  2144  7.6890  0.6109  5.0370  10.1266 
Children  2144  0.5233  0.4996  0  1 
German  2144  0.9352  0.2463  0  1 
Year 2008  2144  0.4795  0.4997  0  1 
Federal States  2144  7.8354  3.7327  1  15 36 














Table A.4: Descriptive statistics for different samples (2007/2008): not employed, men and women 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Reservation Wages hourly  1905  2.0282  .4382  .1625  4.0745 
Reservation Wages monthly  1905  6.8949  0.5319  3.9120  9.2102 
Desired Working Hours  1905  33.4252  11.4150  2  80 
Leisure Satisfaction  1905  6.9239  2.1996  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  1905  6.2766  2.1244  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  1905  0.2446  0.4300  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  1905  0.2467  0.4312  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  1905  0.1890  0.3916  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  1905  0.0740  0.2619  0  1 
Intermediate School  1905  0.3491  0.4768  0  1 
Upper School  1905  0.2373  0.4255  0  1 
Vocational Degree  1905  0.5827  0.4932  0  1 
College Degree  1905  0.1087  0.3113  0  1 
Health: normal  1905  0.2892  0.4535  0  1 
Health: bad  1905  0.1717  0.3772  0  1 
Household Income  1905  7.4927  0.6730  5.0370  10.1266 
Female  1905  0.5906  0.4919  0  1 
Children  1905  0.4724  0.4994  0  1 
German  1905  0.9318  0.2522  0  1 
Year 2008  1905  0.4509  0.4977  0  1 
Federal States  1905  8.4136  3.9929  1  15 
Unemployment Rate  1905  12.1472  4.5869  4.4  21.2 
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Table A.5: Descriptive statistics for different samples (2007/2008): not employed, men  
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Reservation Wages hourly  780  2.0346  0.4427  0.5680  4.0745 
Reservation Wages monthly  780  7.1036  0.4835  4.6052  9.2102 
Desired Working Hours  780  38.8718  8.4303  6  70 
Leisure Satisfaction  780  7.0679  2.1400  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  780  5.8705  2.2010  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  780  0.1987  0.3993  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  780  0.1910  0.3934  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  780  0.2141  0.4105  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  780  0.1103  0.3134  0  1 
Intermediate School  780  0.2923  0.4551  0  1 
Upper School  780  0.2231  0.4166  0  1 
Vocational Degree  780  0.5641  0.4962  0  1 
College Degree  780  0.0859  0.2804  0  1 
Health: normal  780  0.2628  0.4404  0  1 
Health: bad  780  0.1859  0.3893  0  1 
Household Income  780  7.3890  0.7097  5.2983  10.1266 
Children  780  0.3000  0.4586  0  1 
German  780  0.9346  0.2474  0  1 
Year 2008  780  0.4500  0.4978  0  1 
Federal States  780  8.8872  3.9810  1  15 
Unemployment Rate  780  12.7030  4.6337  4.4  21.2 
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Table A.6: Descriptive statistics for different samples (2007/2008) not employed, women 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Reservation Wages hourly  1125  2.0238  0.4352  0.1625  4.0745 
Reservation Wages monthly  1125  6.7503  0.5158  3.9120  8.2940 
Desired Working Hours  1125  29.6489  11.6880  2  80 
Leisure Satisfaction  1125  6.8240  2.2355  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  1125  6.5582  2.0233  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  1125  0.2764  0.4474  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  1125  0.2853  0.4518  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  1125  0.1716  0.3772  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  1125  0.0489  0.2157  0  1 
Intermediate School  1125  0.3884  0.4876  0  1 
Upper School  1125  0.2471  0.4315  0  1 
Vocational Degree  1125  0.5956  0.4910  0  1 
College Degree  1125  0.1244  0.3302  0  1 
Health: normal  1125  0.3076  0.4617  0  1 
Health: bad  1125  0.1618  0.3684  0  1 
Household Income  1125  7.5645  0.6368  5.0370  9.4335 
Children  1125  0.5920  0.4917  0  1 
German  1125  0.9298  0.2556  0  1 
Year 2008  1125  0.4516  0.4979  0  1 
Federal States  1125  8.0853  3.9698  1  15 
Unemployment Rate  1125  11.7620  4.5162  4.4  21.2 
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Table A.7: Descriptive statistics for different samples (2007/2008): employed, men and women 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Entry Wages hourly  1907  1.8843  0.5027  0.0225  4.4205 
Entry Wages monthly  1907  6.7481  0.7714  3.2958  9.7981 
Desired Working Hours  1907  34.0354  11.2614  0  75 
Actual Working Hours  1907  35.0142  14.8537  1  77 
Leisure Satisfaction  1907  6.3844  2.2451  0  10 
Job Satisfaction  1907  7.0703  2.1198  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  1907  6.9748  1.7433  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  1907  0.3199  0.4665  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  1907  0.2653  0.4416  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  1907  0.1636  0.3700  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  1907  0.0535  0.2251  0  1 
Intermediate School  1907  0.3571  0.4793  0  1 
Upper School  1907  0.3110  0.4630  0  1 
Vocational Degree  1907  0.6943  0.4608  0  1 
College Degree  1907  0.2098  0.4072  0  1 
Health: normal  1907  0.2853  0.4517  0  1 
Health: bad  1907  0.0902  0.2865  0  1 
Household Income  1907  7.8100  0.5424  5.6384  10.3090 
Female  1907  0.5343  0.4989  0  1 
Children  1907  0.4017  0.4904  0  1 
German  1907  0.9229  0.2668  0  1 
Year 2008  1907  0.4929  0.5001  0  1 
Federal States  1907  7.7514  3.5128  1  15 
Unemployment Rate  1907  10.6507  4.5030  4.4  21.2 
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Table A.8: Descriptive statistics for different samples (2007/2008): employed, men  
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Entry Wages hourly  888  1.9330  0.5267  0.0225  4.2569 
Entry Wages monthly  888  7.0412  0.7184  3.8712  9.7981 
Desired Working Hours  888  39.2095  9.0865  0  75 
Actual Working Hours  888  41.8833  12.6829  2  77 
Leisure Satisfaction  888  6.2815  2.2119  0  10 
Job Satisfaction  888  6.9595  2.1647  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  888  6.9020  1.7545  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  888  0.3356  0.4725  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  888  0.2455  0.4306  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  888  0.1554  0.3625  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  888  0.0766  0.2661  0  1 
Intermediate School  888  0.3390  0.4736  0  1 
Upper School  888  0.2838  0.4511  0  1 
Vocational Degree  888  0.7027  0.4573  0  1 
College Degree  888  0.1971  0.3980  0   
Health: normal  888  0.2905  0.4543  0  1 
Health: bad  888  0.0777  0.2679  0  1 
Household Income  888  7.7910  0.5339  6.0064  10.3090 
Children  888  0.3491  0.4770  0  1 
German  888  0.9020  0.2974  0  1 
Year 2008  888  0.4730  0.4996  0  1 
Federal States  888  7.9718  3.5917  1  15 
Unemployment Rate  888  10.9224  4.6645  4.4  21.2 
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Table A.9: Descriptive statistics for different samples (2007/2008): employed, women 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Entry Wages hourly  1019  1.8419  0.4770  0.0572  4.4205 
Entry Wages monthly  1019  6.4927  0.7241  3.2958  8.2687 
Desired Working Hours  1019  29.5265  11.0364  0  60 
Actual Working Hours  1019  29.0282  13.9965  1  75 
Leisure Satisfaction  1019  6.4740  2.2710  0  10 
Job Satisfaction  1019  7.1668  2.0761  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  1019  7.0383  1.7319  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  1019  0.3062  0.4611  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  1019  0.2826  0.4505  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  1019  0.1708  0.3765  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  1019  0.0334  0.1797  0  1 
Intermediate School  1019  0.3729  0.4838  0  1 
Upper School  1019  0.3346  0.4721  0  1 
Vocational Degree  1019  0.6869  0.4640  0  1 
College Degree  1019  0.2208  0.4150  0  1 
Health: normal  1019  0.2807  0.4495  0  1 
Health: bad  1019  0.1011  0.3016  0  1 
Household Income  1019  7.8265  0.5495  5.6384  10.1266 
Children  1019  0.4475  0.4975  0  1 
German  1019  0.9411  0.2355  0  1 
Year 2008  1019  0.5103  0.5001  0  1 
Federal States  1019  7.5594  3.4329  1  15 
Unemployment Rate  1019  10.4138  4.3458  4.4  21.2 
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Table A.10: Descriptive statistics for different samples (1997-2008): all (not-employed, employed), men and women 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Desired Working Hours  101500  34.9537  9.5493  .4  99.9 
Actual Working Hours  101500  38.3921  11.9000  1  80 
Leisure Satisfaction  101500  6.5124  2.1414  0  10 
Job Satisfaction  101500  7.0241  1.9661  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  101500  7.1042  1.6007  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  101500  0.2378  0.4257  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  101500  0.3188  0.4660  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  101500  0.2614  0.4394  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  101500  0.1102  0.3132  0  1 
Intermediate School  101500  0.3623  0.4807  0  1 
Upper School  101500  0.2716  0.4448  0  1 
Vocational Degree  101500  0.7277  0.4451  0  1 
College Degree  101500  0.2319  0.4221  0  1 
Health: normal  101500  0.3093  0.4622  0  1 
Health: bad  101500  0.0993  0.2991  0  1 
Household Income  101500  7.9199  0.4750  3.8286  11.5308 
Female  101500  0.4664  0.4989  0  1 
Children  101500  0.3942  0.4887  0  1 
German  101500  0.9135  0.2811  0  1 
Unemployment Rate  101500  12.1667  5.1103  4.1  25.7 
Federal States  101500  7.7224  3.4697  1  15 
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Table A.11: Descriptive statistics for different samples (1997-2008): all (not-employed, employed), men  
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Desired Working Hours  54164  38.9960  7.0750  1  99.9 
Actual Working Hours  54164  43.3535  8.7983  1  80 
Leisure Satisfaction  54164  6.5151  2.1172  0  10 
Job Satisfaction  54164  7.0375  1.9450  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  54164  7.1249  1.5713  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  54164  0.2450  0.4301  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  54164  0.3166  0.4651  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  54164  0.2529  0.4347  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  54164  0.1216  0.3269  0  1 
Intermediate School  54164  0.3154  0.4647  0  1 
Upper School  54164  0.2822  0.4501  0  1 
Vocational Degree  54164  0.7323  0.4428  0  1 
College Degree  54164  0.2410  0.4277  0  1 
Health: normal  54164  0.3045  0.4602  0  1 
Health: bad  54164  0.0910  0.2876  0  1 
Household Income  54164  7.9354  0.4530  4.5747  11.3504 
Children  54164  0.4187  0.4933  0  1 
German  54164  0.9035  0.2953  0  1 
Unemployment Rate  54164  12.0308  5.0408  4.1  25.7 




Table A.12: Descriptive statistics for different samples (1997-2008): all (not-employed, employed), women 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Desired Working Hours  47336  30.3283  9.9079  0.4  90 
Actual Working Hours  47336  32.7152  12.4371  1  80 
Leisure Satisfaction  47336  6.5093  2.1688  0  10 
Job Satisfaction  47336  7.0088  1.9899  0  10 
Overall Life Satisfaction  47336  7.0805  1.6334  0  10 
Age Cat. 26-35  47336  0.2296  0.4205  0  1 
Age Cat. 36-45  47336  0.3213  0.4670  0  1 
Age Cat. 46-55  47336  0.2711  0.4445  0  1 
Age Cat. 56-65  47336  0.0972  0.2962  0  1 
Intermediate School  47336  0.4159  0.4929  0  1 
Upper School  47336  0.2596  0.4384  0  1 
Vocational Degree  47336  0.7225  0.4478  0  1 
College Degree  47336  0.2216  0.4153  0  1 
Health: normal  47336  0.3148  0.4644  0  1 
Health: bad  47336  0.1088  0.3114  0  1 
Household Income  47336  7.9022  0.4984  3.8286  11.5308 
Children  47336  0.3662  0.4818  0  1 
German  47336  0.9250  0.2634  0  1 
Unemployment Rate  47336  12.3222  5.1843  4.4  25.7 
Federal States  47336  7.7925  3.5097  1  15 46 
Appendix B: Results from panel estimations 
Table B.1: Preferred working hours (1997-2008, random and fixed effects) 












Age Categories           
Ref: 18-25           
26 - 35  -0.2314**  1.3071***  0.6836***  -1.2315***  -1.1326*** 
  (0.1053)  (0.1375)  (0.1657)  (0.1575)  (0.1831) 
36 - 45  -0.5304***  1.2908***  0.6860***  -2.0881***  -1.2326*** 
  (0.1186)  (0.1516)  (0.1946)  (0.1802)  (0.2278) 
46 - 55  -0.9401***  1.0664***  0.7339***  -2.9748***  -1.3594*** 
  (0.1282)  (0.1628)  (0.2221)  (0.1941)  (0.2606) 
56 - 65  -1.9730***  0.2150  0.3371  -4.1800***  -1.7873*** 
  (0.1488)  (0.1852)  (0.2583)  (0.2305)  (0.3105) 
Female  -8.9498***         
  (0.1087)         
Children  -1.8222***  0.1004  -0.0856  -4.2532***  -3.3345*** 
  (0.0632)  (0.0775)  (0.0887)  (0.1011)  (0.1146) 
Intermediate School  0.6884***  0.4436***  0.6770***  1.0098***  0.4029 
  (0.1124)  (0.1362)  (0.2322)  (0.1749)  (0.3055) 
Upper School  -0.2336*  -0.7537***  1.1245***  0.1608  0.7018* 
  (0.1369)  (0.1661)  (0.2928)  (0.2136)  (0.3899) 
Vocational Degree  1.3045***  1.0843***  0.4469***  1.4142***  0.6362*** 
  (0.0906)  (0.1125)  (0.1488)  (0.1403)  (0.1833) 
College Degree  3.0421***  2.1688***  4.1715***  3.4455***  5.4054*** 47 
  (0.1362)  (0.1657)  (0.2830)  (0.2124)  (0.3765) 
Health           
Ref: Good           
Normal  -0.1745***  -0.0876  -0.0725  -0.2808***  -0.3214*** 
  (0.0496)  (0.0630)  (0.0670)  (0.0772)  (0.0811) 
Bad  -0.4050***  -0.2330**  -0.1997*  -0.5777***  -0.7207*** 
  (0.0790)  (0.1030)  (0.1107)  (0.1193)  (0.1265) 
Household Income  -0.0189  0.6505***  0.4515***  -0.5335***  -0.0321 
  (0.0678)  (0.0898)  (0.1085)  (0.0995)  (0.1174) 
German  -1.2425***  -0.5539***  -0.7869**  -1.9018***  -1.3902** 
  (0.1733)  (0.1991)  (0.4006)  (0.2838)  (0.5728) 
Unemployment Rate  0.0300**  0.0008  0.0141  0.0626***  0.0820*** 
  (0.0122)  (0.0155)  (0.0161)  (0.0190)  (0.0195) 
Federal States  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  38.5969***  31.4852***  33.7030***  35.5439***  28.9977*** 
  (0.6394)  (0.8244)  (1.2599)  (0.9481)  (1.5214) 
R
2  0.2496  0.0188  0.0079  0.1785  0.0335 
Breusch-Pagan-Test  76567.62  27260.09    36876.43   
F-Test      6.06    7.88 
Hausman-Test    328.18  714.26 
Number of Observations  101500  54164  54164  47336  47336 
Number of Individuals  20712  10733  10733  9979  9979 
Notes: Random Effects GLS, Fixed Effects OLS, robust standard errors in parentheses, levels 
of significance ***1%, **5%, *10%, GSOEP (1997-2008). 
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Table B.2: Actual working hours (1997-2008, random and fixed effects) 












Age Categories           
Ref: 18-25           
26 - 35  0.5582***  2.5767***  1.2637***  -0.7854***  -1.1015*** 
  (0.1182)  (0.1545)  (0.1788)  (0.1763)  (0.1979) 
36 - 45  0.2177  2.8578***  1.1678***  -2.0963***  -2.0478*** 
  (0.1349)  (0.1721)  (0.2100)  (0.2051)  (0.2462) 
46 - 55  -0.5284***  2.4180***  0.6097**  -3.4338***  -2.9394*** 
  (0.1473)  (0.1867)  (0.2398)  (0.2236)  (0.2817) 
56 - 65  -1.6696***  1.3937***  -0.1830  -4.5925***  -3.6780*** 
  (0.1715)  (0.2132)  (0.2788)  (0.2658)  (0.3357) 
Female  -11.0108***         
  (0.1393)         
Children  -2.4358***  0.0334  -0.1801*  -5.5365***  -4.4660*** 
  (0.0706)  (0.0866)  (0.0958)  (0.1131)  (0.1239) 
Intermediate School  1.1018***  0.7698***  0.4932**  1.6088***  0.3676 
  (0.1342)  (0.1615)  (0.2506)  (0.2100)  (0.3303) 
Upper School  0.1849  -0.5586***  1.3182***  0.7823***  0.1840 
  (0.1632)  (0.1962)  (0.3161)  (0.2566)  (0.4215) 
Vocational Degree  1.6605***  1.4637***  0.5100***  1.7806***  0.8592*** 
  (0.1041)  (0.1290)  (0.1606)  (0.1615)  (0.1981) 
College Degree  5.4278***  4.2338***  5.7065***  6.2372***  7.8177*** 
  (0.1617)  (0.1949)  (0.3055)  (0.2544)  (0.4070) 
Health           49 
Ref: Good           
Normal  0.0722  0.1381**  0.1165  -0.0094  -0.0505 
  (0.0545)  (0.0692)  (0.0723)  (0.0847)  (0.0877) 
Bad  0.1561*  0.1827  0.1597  0.1263  0.0139 
  (0.0870)  (0.1135)  (0.1195)  (0.1312)  (0.1368) 
Household Income  1.7368***  2.2042***  1.8155***  1.4459***  1.6561*** 
  (0.0764)  (0.1013)  (0.1172)  (0.1122)  (0.1269) 
German  -0.7129***  0.1893  0.1017  -1.7245***  -1.4185** 
  (0.2102)  (0.2397)  (0.4325)  (0.3464)  (0.6192) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.0594***  -0.0883***  -0.0975***  -0.0238  -0.0317 
  (0.0133)  (0.0170)  (0.0174)  (0.0207)  (0.0211) 
Federal States  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  27.5318***  20.9573***  25.8553***  21.6904***  22.0516*** 
  (0.7387)  (0.9462)  (1.3600)  (1.0993)  (1.6447) 
R
2  0.2676  0.0735  0.0199  0.1952  0.0524 
Breusch-Pagan-Test  100000  38425.18    51803.79   
F-Test      8.59    11.51 
Hausman-Test    552.20  707.82 
Number of Observations  101500  54164  54164  47336  47336 
Number of Individuals  20712  10733  10733  9979  9979 
Notes: Random Effects GLS, Fixed Effects OLS, robust standard errors in parentheses, levels 




Table B.3: Satisfaction with leisure (1997-2008, random and fixed effects) 





Effects  Fixed Effects 
Random 
Effects  Fixed Effects 
Age Categories           
Ref: 18-25           
26 - 35  -0.1893***  -0.2835***  -0.2409***  -0.0936**  -0.0345 
  (0.0273)  (0.0387)  (0.0496)  (0.0387)  (0.0494) 
36 - 45  -0.1182***  -0.1936***  -0.2054***  -0.0468  0.0426 
  (0.0298)  (0.0419)  (0.0583)  (0.0426)  (0.0615) 
46 - 55  0.0585*  -0.0039  -0.0950  0.1103**  0.2181*** 
  (0.0314)  (0.0443)  (0.0666)  (0.0446)  (0.0704) 
56 - 65  0.2031***  0.1010**  -0.0746  0.3096***  0.3523*** 
  (0.0362)  (0.0500)  (0.0774)  (0.0529)  (0.0839) 
Female  -0.0120         
  (0.0218)         
Children  -0.2922***  -0.2681***  -0.1973***  -0.3263***  -0.2474*** 
  (0.0164)  (0.0219)  (0.0265)  (0.0247)  (0.0309) 
Intermediate School  -0.0237  -0.0488  0.0217  0.0086  -0.1827** 
  (0.0252)  (0.0348)  (0.0694)  (0.0365)  (0.0824) 
Upper School  -0.0415  -0.0765*  0.0735  0.0001  -0.1337 
  (0.0309)  (0.0428)  (0.0876)  (0.0448)  (0.1051) 
Vocational Degree  0.0114  -0.0064  -0.0180  0.0272  0.0041 
  (0.0220)  (0.0304)  (0.0445)  (0.0318)  (0.0494) 
College Degree  -0.2377***  -0.2483***  -0.0688  -0.2158***  -0.2288** 
  (0.0309)  (0.0430)  (0.0846)  (0.0446)  (0.1015) 
Health           51 
Ref: Good           
Normal  -0.2329***  -0.1859***  -0.1372***  -0.2851***  -0.2238*** 
  (0.0137)  (0.0187)  (0.0202)  (0.0202)  (0.0221) 
Bad  -0.3249***  -0.2685***  -0.2167***  -0.3843***  -0.2891*** 
  (0.0221)  (0.0309)  (0.0339)  (0.0315)  (0.0348) 
Household Income  -0.1275***  -0.1118***  -0.0846***  -0.1452***  -0.2052*** 
  (0.0173)  (0.0251)  (0.0325)  (0.0239)  (0.0317) 
German  0.3738***  0.3386***  -0.0642  0.4261***  -0.1631 
  (0.0378)  (0.0499)  (0.1198)  (0.0577)  (0.1544) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.0170***  -0.0085*  -0.0107**  -0.0266***  -0.0243*** 
  (0.0034)  (0.0046)  (0.0048)  (0.0050)  (0.0053) 
Overall Life Satisfaction  0.3195***  0.3110***  0.2361***  0.3292***  0.2441*** 
  (0.0043)  (0.0059)  (0.0067)  (0.0062)  (0.0070) 
Federal States  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  5.7101***  5.6077***  6.3104***  5.8079***  7.4136*** 
  (0.1576)  (0.2263)  (0.3791)  (0.2192)  (0.4124) 
R
2  0.1588  0.1495  0.0363  0.1709  0.0446 
Breusch-Pagan-Test  46635.29  27423.27    19131.21   
F-Test      4.75    4.12 
Hausman-Test    726.69  779.60 
Number of Observations  101500  54164  54164  47336  47336 
Number of Individuals  20712  10733  10733  9979  9979 
Notes: Random Effects GLS, Fixed Effects OLS, robust standard errors in parentheses, levels of 
significance ***1%, **5%, *10%, GSOEP (1997-2008). 
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Table B.4: Satisfaction with job (1997-2008, random and fixed effects) 





Effects  Fixed Effects 
Random 
Effects  Fixed Effects 
Age Categories           
Ref: 18-25           
26 - 35  -0.0380  -0.0462  -0.1316***  -0.0395  -0.1688*** 
  (0.0252)  (0.0350)  (0.0465)  (0.0366)  (0.0480) 
36 - 45  -0.0597**  -0.0835**  -0.2187***  -0.0429  -0.2777*** 
  (0.0273)  (0.0375)  (0.0546)  (0.0399)  (0.0598) 
46 - 55  -0.0892***  -0.1488***  -0.3910***  -0.0291  -0.4230*** 
  (0.0286)  (0.0393)  (0.0624)  (0.0416)  (0.0684) 
56 - 65  -0.1115***  -0.1610***  -0.5648***  -0.0746  -0.6740*** 
  (0.0329)  (0.0443)  (0.0725)  (0.0493)  (0.0816) 
Female  -0.0094         
  (0.0190)         
Children  0.0467***  -0.0219  -0.0208  0.1274***  0.1165*** 
  (0.0151)  (0.0197)  (0.0249)  (0.0232)  (0.0300) 
Intermediate School  -0.0202  0.0057  0.0201  -0.0556*  -0.0672 
  (0.0224)  (0.0301)  (0.0651)  (0.0334)  (0.0801) 
Upper School  -0.0457*  0.0118  -0.0125  -0.1100***  0.0943 
  (0.0275)  (0.0371)  (0.0821)  (0.0410)  (0.1022) 
Vocational Degree  0.0330*  0.0350  0.0666  0.0377  0.0208 
  (0.0199)  (0.0268)  (0.0417)  (0.0296)  (0.0480) 
College Degree  0.0514*  0.0417  0.0268  0.0484  -0.0070 
  (0.0275)  (0.0374)  (0.0793)  (0.0409)  (0.0987) 
Health           53 
Ref: Good           
Normal  -0.3700***  -0.3748***  -0.3036***  -0.3628***  -0.3065*** 
  (0.0129)  (0.0172)  (0.0190)  (0.0193)  (0.0215) 
Bad  -0.6758***  -0.6847***  -0.6002***  -0.6666***  -0.5736*** 
  (0.0206)  (0.0284)  (0.0317)  (0.0300)  (0.0339) 
Household Income  0.0770***  0.1097***  0.0804***  0.0522**  -0.0219 
  (0.0158)  (0.0224)  (0.0305)  (0.0224)  (0.0308) 
German  0.1174***  0.0828*  -0.2048*  0.1485***  0.1462 
  (0.0334)  (0.0428)  (0.1123)  (0.0526)  (0.1502) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.0039  -0.0053  -0.0093**  -0.0019  -0.0058 
  (0.0032)  (0.0043)  (0.0045)  (0.0048)  (0.0051) 
Overall Life Satisfaction  0.3916***  0.4242***  0.3516***  0.3585***  0.2885*** 
  (0.0040)  (0.0054)  (0.0062)  (0.0059)  (0.0068) 
Federal States  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  3.8316***  3.3534***  4.3869***  4.2492***  5.7314*** 
  (0.1434)  (0.2013)  (0.3553)  (0.2046)  (0.4010) 
R
2  0.2184  0.2524  0.0958  0.1861  0.0707 
Breusch-Pagan-Test  22177.39  12471.88    9434.75   
F-Test-Test      3.39    3.14 
Hausman-Test    678.73  573.66 
Number of Observations  101500  54164  54164  47336  47336 
Number of Individuals  20712  10733  10733  9979  9979 
Notes: Random Effects GLS, Fixed Effects OLS, robust standard errors in parentheses, levels of 
significance ***1%, **5%, *10%, GSOEP (1997-2008). 
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Figures and Tables Included in Text 
Table 1: Age and employment rates (in %) for Germany in 2007 and 2008 
  2007  2008 
Age Groups  Men  Women  Men  Women 
15 - 20  34.9  29.6  35.5  29.2 
20 - 25  74.6  67.6  74.7  68.5 
25 - 30  86.7  75.9  86.7  76.2 
30 - 35  94.9  77.4  94.6  76.4 
35 - 40  96.4  80.4  96.0  80.1 
40 - 45  95.6  83.7  95.6  83.6 
45 - 50  94.4  83.9  94.2  83.9 
50 - 55  91.4  79.2  90.9  79.7 
55 - 60  82.7  66.7  83.3  67.5 
60 - 65  45.1  27.4  46.6  29.4 
> 65   5.3  2.4  5.7  2.5 
Total: 15 - 65  81.6  69.2  81.8  69.6 
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Table 2: Overview of previous studies on reservation wages 
Study: Author  Data: Country, source, years  Reservation wage variable, method   Findings 
Kiefer / Neumann (1979)  USA, Survey, 1969-1973  Weekly reservation wages, 
Maximum-Likelihood, 
Reservation wages decline over duration of unemployment  
Gordon / Blinder (1980)   USA, LRHS, 1969-1973  Calculated hourly reservation 
wages, OLS 
Reservation wages increase with age and bad health, decline 
with marriage, mixed effects for children (sample: only men). 
Franz (1982)  Germany,  Unemployment 
Register, 1976  
Monthly reservation wages, OLS  Unemployment compensations  increase over duration of 
unemployment. 
Feldstein / Poterba (1984)  USA, Current Population 
Survey May 1976, 1976 
Monthly reservation wages, OLS  Unemployment insurances increase duration of 
unemployment. 
Maani / Studenmund (1986)  Chile, Survey,  1981-1982  Monthly reservation wages, OLS, 
2SLS, 
Reservation wages decline over duration of unemployment 
(sample: only men). 
Jones (1989)  Great Britain, Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1982, 
Monthly reservation wages, OLS  Last wages influence reservation wages positive. Higher 
reservation wages for men, especially for husbands. 
Schmidt / Winkelmann 
(1993) 
Germany, Federal Secretary 
of Labor ,1978 
Monthly reservation wages, OLS  Reservation wages decline with duration of unemployment. 
Higher reservation wages for men. No significance for age.  
Gorter / Gorter (1993)  Netherlands, SEP, 1985-1987  Monthly reservation wages, OLS, 
2SLS,  
Reservation wages increase with age and education level. 
 
Bloemen / Stancanelli (2001)  Netherlands, SEP, 1987-
1990,  
Monthly & hourly reservation 
wages, OLS, IV, 
Inverse u-shaped effect of age on reservation wages. Wealth  
increase reservation wages.  
Prasad  (2001)  Germany, GSOEP,  
1984-1997 
Monthly reservation wages, OLS,   Inverse u-shaped effect of age on reservation wages. Marriage 
and  children lower reservation wages.  
Prasad  (2004)  Germany, GSOEP,  
1984-1997 
Monthly reservation wages, OLS,  Higher reservation wages for married men. Children increase 
only men´s reservation wages. 
Christensen  (2005)  Germany, GSOEP,  
1984-2000  
Monthly reservation wages, OLS, 
IV 
Reservation wages constant over duration of unemployment.  
Reservation wages higher than last market wages. 
Addison et al.  (2009)  13 European Countries, 
ECHP, 1994-1999 
Hourly reservation wages, random 
& fixed effects 
Reservation wages constant with duration of unemployment. 
Unemployment benefits increase reservation wages.  
Brown et al. (2010a)  Great Britain ,BHPS,  
1991-2004 
Weekly reservation wages, OLS,   Reservation wages and market wages rise with age, decline 
after age 55. No influence of health on reservation wages 
(sample: only men). 
Brown et al. (2010b)  Great Britain ,BHPS,  
1991-2007 
Hourly reservation wages, Oaxaca 
Decomposition 
Reservation wages higher for men.  Reservation wages lower 
with duration of unemployment. 
Pannenberg  (2010)  Germany, GSOEP, 2004-
2006 
Monthly reservation wages, OLS, 
fixed effects 
Risk aversion lowers reservation wages. Reservation wages 
lower with duration of unemployment. 57 
Constant et al. (2010)  Germany, IZA Evaluation 
Dataset , 2007-2008 
Hourly reservation wages, OLS, 
Oaxaca Decomposition 
Reservation wages increases between generations of migrants.  
Krueger / Mueller (2011)  USA (New Jersey), Survey, 
24 weeks in 2009-2010 
Hourly reservation wages, 
OLS, probit 
Reservation wages rise with age, decline after age 50. 
Reservation wages close to last market wage. Amount  of job 
search time decline over unemployment duration.  58 
Table 3: Variable list and definitions  
Variable  Definition 
Reservation Wages hourly (non-employed)  log  reservation  wages  per  hour  in  Euro.  (Reservation 
Wages monthly / (4.25* Desired Working Hours))  
Reservation Wages monthly (non-employed)  log reservation wages per month in Euro 
Entry Wages hourly (employed)  log  entry  wages  per  hour  (only  tenure  less  one  year). 
(Wages monthly / (4.25*Actual Working Hours)  
Entry Wages monthly (employed)  log entry wages per month (only tenure less one year) 
Desired Working Hours (non-employed)   desired number of working hours (non-employed) 
Desired Working Hours (employed)  desired number of working hours (employed) 
Actual Working Hours (employed)  real number of working hours (employed) 
Job Satisfaction (employed)  satisfaction with job: scale 0 to 10 (0:low, 10:high) 
Leisure Satisfaction  satisfaction with leisure: scale 0 to 10 (0:low, 10:high) 
Overall Life Satisfaction  overall life satisfaction: scale 0 to 10 (0:low, 10:high) 
Age Categories  dummies for five age categories: 18-25 (reference), 26-
35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65 
Household Income  log adjusted household income in Euro 
Female  dummy for being female 
Children   dummy for having children under age of 16 in household 
German   dummy for having German citizenship 
Year 2008  dummy for year 2008 
Federal States   15  German  federal  states  (East  and  West  Berlin  as 
Berlin, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland as Rhineland-
Palatinate / Saarland) 
Unemployment Rate  German federal states' unemployment rate (information 
per state and month, for Rhineland-Palatinate / Saarland 
information per regional directorate and month) 
Health  dummies for state of health: good  (reference), normal, 
bad 
Intermediate School  dummy  for  having  an  intermediate  school  degree 
(German Realschule) 
Upper School  dummy  for  having  an  upper  school  degree  (German 
Abitur) 
Vocational Degree  dummy for having a vocational degree 
College Degree  dummy for having a college degree 59 
Table 4: Hourly reservation and entry wages (2007/2008) 












Entry    
Wages 
Age Categories             
Ref: 18-25             
26 - 35  0.1472***  0.1315***  0.1983***  0.1362***  0.0901**  0.1572*** 
  (0.0288)  (0.0298)  (0.0440)  (0.0448)  (0.0371)  (0.0412) 
36 - 45  0.1725***  0.1659***  0.1835***  0.2487***  0.1362***  0.1378*** 
  (0.0302)  (0.0325)  (0.0489)  (0.0492)  (0.0394)  (0.0446) 
46 - 55  0.1752***  0.1354***  0.1849***  0.1898***  0.1473***  0.1055** 
  (0.0345)  (0.0373)  (0.0526)  (0.0543)  (0.0461)  (0.0496) 
56 - 65  0.2268***  0.1948***  0.2341***  0.2360***  0.2142***  0.1458* 
  (0.0425)  (0.0529)  (0.0570)  (0.0691)  (0.0695)  (0.0789) 
Female  -0.0660***  -0.1302***         
  (0.0202)  (0.0206)         
Children  0.0365  0.0671***  0.0036  0.1220***  0.0680**  0.0165 
  (0.0227)  (0.0231)  (0.0358)  (0.0328)  (0.0295)  (0.0322) 
Intermediate School  -0.0170  0.0733***  -0.0546  0.0577  -0.0073  0.0755** 
  (0.0230)  (0.0269)  (0.0345)  (0.0382)  (0.0315)  (0.0376) 
Upper School  0.1865***  0.1935***  0.1998***  0.1573***  0.1786***  0.1976*** 
  (0.0288)  (0.0318)  (0.0471)  (0.0480)  (0.0367)  (0.0422) 
Vocational Degree  -0.0254  0.0135  0.0420  0.0344  -0.0572**  -0.0160 
  (0.0223)  (0.0260)  (0.0353)  (0.0376)  (0.0289)  (0.0344) 
College Degree  0.0654*  0.1865***  -0.0214  0.1962***  0.1099***  0.1657*** 
  (0.0338)  (0.0337)  (0.0656)  (0.0500)  (0.0388)  (0.0439) 
Health             60 
Ref: Good             
Normal  -0.0299  -0.0030  -0.0399  -0.0376  -0.0209  0.0145 
  (0.0229)  (0.0235)  (0.0391)  (0.0326)  (0.0285)  (0.0327) 
Bad  -0.0729***  -0.0324  -0.0779*  -0.0511  -0.0735**  -0.0281 
  (0.0282)  (0.0375)  (0.0434)  (0.0684)  (0.0370)  (0.0440) 
Household Income  0.0701***  0.2054***  0.0927***  0.3390***  0.0549**  0.0981*** 
  (0.0169)  (0.0225)  (0.0269)  (0.0349)  (0.0229)  (0.0283) 
German  -0.0404  0.1327***  -0.0914  0.1581***  -0.0040  0.1340* 
  (0.0438)  (0.0474)  (0.0664)  (0.0599)  (0.0579)  (0.0755) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.0161  -0.0085  0.0121  -0.0207  -0.0356*  0.0095 
  (0.0166)  (0.0167)  (0.0300)  (0.0223)  (0.0188)  (0.0249) 
Year 2008  0.0003  -0.0218  0.1059  -0.0391  -0.0683*  -0.0111 
  (0.0359)  (0.0327)  (0.0655)  (0.0446)  (0.0406)  (0.0474) 
Federal States  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  1.6160***  0.0938  1.0572***  -0.8232**  1.9041***  0.6313* 
  (0.2128)  (0.2637)  (0.3470)  (0.3700)  (0.2694)  (0.3831) 
R
2  0.1592  0.2635  0.1761  0.3746  0.1766  0.2023 
adjusted R
2  0.1458  0.2517  0.1442  0.3534  0.1548  0.1789 
F-Test  14.1749  20.8078  6.0783  16.5399  11.6065  8.6610 
Number of Observations  1905  1907  780  888  1125  1019 
Number of Individuals  1522  1757  617  819  905  938 
Notes: OLS, robust standard errors in parentheses, levels of significance *** 1%, **5%, *10%, GSOEP (2007-2008). 61 
Table 5: Monthly reservation and entry wages (2007/2008) 












Entry    
Wages 
Age Categories             
Ref: 18-25             
26 - 35  0.0300  0.2623***  0.2296***  0.3652***  -0.0917*  0.2868*** 
  (0.0364)  (0.0445)  (0.0524)  (0.0616)  (0.0483)  (0.0595) 
36 - 45  0.0309  0.2507***  0.2370***  0.4598***  -0.0706  0.2058*** 
  (0.0377)  (0.0477)  (0.0542)  (0.0641)  (0.0499)  (0.0664) 
46 - 55  -0.0345  0.1267**  0.1408**  0.3125***  -0.1500***  0.0365 
  (0.0387)  (0.0538)  (0.0555)  (0.0778)  (0.0529)  (0.0712) 
56 - 65  -0.0264  0.1099  0.1516**  0.3017***  -0.1787**  -0.0120 
  (0.0502)  (0.0798)  (0.0649)  (0.0958)  (0.0768)  (0.1302) 
Female  -0.3476***  -0.5675***         
  (0.0240)  (0.0299)         
Children  -0.0833***  -0.1506***  0.0201  0.1536***  -0.1213***  -0.4111*** 
  (0.0265)  (0.0322)  (0.0368)  (0.0439)  (0.0364)  (0.0443) 
Intermediate School  -0.0497*  0.1036***  -0.0464  0.0453  -0.0494  0.1470*** 
  (0.0269)  (0.0396)  (0.0367)  (0.0513)  (0.0375)  (0.0556) 
Upper School  0.1369***  0.0985**  0.1300**  -0.0388  0.1659***  0.1792*** 
  (0.0397)  (0.0482)  (0.0572)  (0.0663)  (0.0516)  (0.0660) 
Vocational Degree  0.0213  0.1766***  0.0904**  0.1299***  -0.0106  0.1689*** 
  (0.0269)  (0.0365)  (0.0381)  (0.0497)  (0.0349)  (0.0497) 
College Degree  0.1709***  0.4437***  0.0509  0.3913***  0.2331***  0.4330*** 
  (0.0409)  (0.0493)  (0.0631)  (0.0652)  (0.0524)  (0.0666) 
Health             62 
Ref: Good             
Normal  -0.0439  -0.0046  -0.0494  -0.0372  -0.0339  0.0040 
  (0.0284)  (0.0342)  (0.0423)  (0.0444)  (0.0361)  (0.0466) 
Bad  -0.0264  -0.0742  -0.0661  -0.1209  -0.0272  -0.0217 
  (0.0308)  (0.0591)  (0.0431)  (0.0890)  (0.0412)  (0.0737) 
Household Income  0.0157  0.3644***  0.1489***  0.5130***  -0.0727***  0.2565*** 
  (0.0212)  (0.0325)  (0.0306)  (0.0480)  (0.0280)  (0.0416) 
German  -0.0775*  0.0547  0.0426  0.1290*  -0.0982*  0.0987 
  (0.0442)  (0.0594)  (0.0610)  (0.0707)  (0.0569)  (0.0955) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.0202  -0.0270  0.0091  -0.0160  -0.0397*  -0.0149 
  (0.0183)  (0.0235)  (0.0297)  (0.0302)  (0.0212)  (0.0347) 
Year 2008  0.0189  -0.0522  0.1190*  -0.0567  -0.0458  -0.0328 
  (0.0418)  (0.0462)  (0.0684)  (0.0586)  (0.0480)  (0.0664) 
Federal States  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  7.2950***  4.0350***  5.5663***  2.6868***  7.9778***  4.1969*** 
  (0.2549)  (0.3614)  (0.3964)  (0.4713)  (0.3048)  (0.5230) 
R
2  0.1705  0.3286  0.1717  0.3786  0.1307  0.2567 
adjusted R
2  0.1572  0.3179  0.1396  0.3576  0.1076  0.2349 
F-Test  13.2320  31.7960  6.2550  16.7539  7.0934  14.4404 
Number of Observations  1905  1907  780  888  1125  1019 
Number of Individuals  1522  1757  617  819  905  938 
Notes: OLS, robust standard errors in parentheses, levels of significance ***1%, **5%, *10%, GSOEP (2007-2008). 63 
Table 6: Preferred and actual working hours (2007/2008) 
  Preferred Hours (non-employed)  Preferred Hours (with job)  Actual Hours (with job) 
  All  Men  Women  All  Men  Women  All  Men  Women 
Age Categories                   
Ref: 18-25                   
26 - 35  -2.8072***  0.9346  -4.4669***  0.7639  3.4974***  -0.0707  3.0895***  6.6477***  2.0932* 
  (0.7563)  (1.0208)  (1.0147)  (0.7226)  (1.0622)  (0.9276)  (0.9337)  (1.3198)  (1.2361) 
36 - 45  -4.0837***  0.7573  -5.7636***  -1.0093  2.4047**  -2.4865**  1.5538  5.8160***  0.2791 
  (0.7452)  (0.9384)  (1.0150)  (0.7710)  (1.0952)  (1.0292)  (0.9664)  (1.3366)  (1.3249) 
46 - 55  -5.5939***  -1.4789  -8.0066***  -1.6334**  2.3495**  -4.1717***  -0.7096  3.7930***  -3.1625** 
  (0.7765)  (1.0309)  (1.0746)  (0.7906)  (1.1003)  (1.0606)  (1.0442)  (1.4622)  (1.4286) 
56 - 65  -6.8624***  -2.9777**  -10.1251***  -3.4772***  0.2108  -5.6007***  -2.8735*  1.7414  -5.7868*** 
  (1.0061)  (1.2791)  (1.6439)  (1.1047)  (1.4860)  (1.8009)  (1.5385)  (2.0876)  (2.1417) 
Female  -7.7125***      -9.0449***      -12.3795***     
  (0.4705)      (0.4618)      (0.5942)     
Children  -3.0764***  0.7184  -5.0129***  -3.8918***  0.8612  -7.8543***  -5.5372***  0.6800  -10.7098*** 
  (0.5423)  (0.7014)  (0.7560)  (0.4866)  (0.6651)  (0.6791)  (0.6216)  (0.8561)  (0.8468) 
Intermediate School  -0.8089  0.2234  -1.1235  -0.0536  -0.8587  0.5422  1.0936  -0.1804  2.1164** 
  (0.5532)  (0.6973)  (0.7876)  (0.5988)  (0.7948)  (0.8199)  (0.7758)  (1.0938)  (1.0398) 
Upper School  -1.0673  -1.1108  -0.4491  -2.0580***  -2.0417*  -2.3708**  -2.0468**  -5.2314***  -0.0255 
  (0.7571)  (1.0810)  (0.9641)  (0.7811)  (1.1327)  (1.0552)  (0.9554)  (1.4443)  (1.2381) 
Vocational Degree  1.0325*  1.4039**  0.8436  3.0667***  1.6156*  3.8076***  3.1147***  1.5797  3.5434*** 
  (0.5647)  (0.6859)  (0.7503)  (0.5865)  (0.8386)  (0.7739)  (0.7388)  (1.0462)  (0.9846) 
College Degree  2.4035***  2.4639  2.4907**  4.3629***  1.9600*  5.3730***  6.3456***  5.4331***  6.2646*** 
  (0.8951)  (1.5971)  (1.0259)  (0.7471)  (1.0657)  (0.9931)  (0.9908)  (1.4282)  (1.3119) 
Health                   
Ref: Good                   64 
Normal  -0.2383  -0.1607  -0.2152  0.1881  0.2448  0.0931  0.4025  -0.0546  0.5455 
  (0.5598)  (0.7703)  (0.7216)  (0.5312)  (0.7400)  (0.7089)  (0.6688)  (0.9479)  (0.8560) 
Bad  1.0623  0.4617  0.8898  -0.2834  0.2880  0.0761  -0.2775  -1.2535  1.0579 
  (0.6486)  (0.8335)  (0.9035)  (0.8385)  (1.2526)  (1.0371)  (1.1995)  (1.7495)  (1.5274) 
Household Income  -1.1407***  1.4748***  -2.8197***  -0.0684  1.1116  -0.8210  3.9578***  4.9854***  3.4911*** 
  (0.3980)  (0.5433)  (0.5349)  (0.4926)  (0.7368)  (0.6190)  (0.6178)  (0.9234)  (0.7958) 
German  -0.7784  3.8876***  -2.3240*  -1.4296  -0.3105  -0.7721  -1.9503  -1.1907  -0.2082 
  (1.0001)  (1.3251)  (1.3181)  (0.9485)  (1.1026)  (1.4767)  (1.2129)  (1.6065)  (1.6918) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.0933  0.0363  -0.1645  -0.1555  0.0150  -0.0062  -0.5432  0.1214  -0.7837 
  (0.3592)  (0.5246)  (0.4711)  (0.3341)  (0.4705)  (0.4678)  (0.4646)  (0.6687)  (0.6257) 
Year 2008  0.3331  0.4747  0.2515  -1.1242  -1.3710  -0.3478  -0.9949  -1.1127  -0.5096 
  (0.8048)  (1.1332)  (1.0470)  (0.7259)  (1.0443)  (0.9710)  (0.9554)  (1.3734)  (1.2492) 
Federal States  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  52.3702***  22.3605***  61.6668***  41.1011***  26.3513***  38.3001***  15.3961**  -0.8641  8.6833 
  (5.0219)  (6.8793)  (6.5655)  (5.4649)  (7.7169)  (7.1140)  (6.9622)  (10.1976)  (8.9957) 
R
2  0.2604  0.0823  0.2601  0.2717  0.0721  0.2673  0.2818  0.1374  0.2472 
adjusted R
2  0.2485  0.0468  0.2405  0.2600  0.0407  0.2458  0.2703  0.1082  0.2252 
F-Test  23.9937  1.9116  19.2132  25.0348  2.0623  15.7000  28.3786  4.5401  13.3876 
Number of Observations  1905  780  1125  1907  888  1019  1907  888  1019 
Number of Individuals  1520  617  905  1757  819  938  1757  819  938 
Notes: OLS, robust standard errors in parentheses, levels of significance *** 1%, **5%, *10%, GSOEP (2007-2008). 65 
Table 7: Satisfaction with leisure and job (2007/2008) 
  Leisure Satisfaction (all)  Leisure Satisfaction (non-employed)  Leisure Satisfaction (with job)  Job Satisfaction (with job) 
  All  Men  Women  All  Men  Women  All  Men  Women  All  Men  Women 
Age Categories                         
Ref: 18-25                         
26 - 35  -0.2880***  -0.4631***  -0.1178  -0.3321**  -0.2017  -0.3002  -0.1251  -0.4024*  0.0938  0.3203**  0.3448*  0.3128* 
  (0.1054)  (0.1549)  (0.1459)  (0.1489)  (0.2100)  (0.2119)  (0.1451)  (0.2134)  (0.1994)  (0.1318)  (0.1949)  (0.1793) 
36 - 45  -0.0476  -0.1520  0.0483  -0.1694  -0.2576  -0.0579  0.0992  0.0594  0.0895  -0.0087  0.0407  0.0250 
  (0.1125)  (0.1732)  (0.1520)  (0.1603)  (0.2638)  (0.2127)  (0.1559)  (0.2327)  (0.2173)  (0.1489)  (0.2338)  (0.1924) 
46 - 55  0.0110  -0.3354*  0.2680  -0.1354  -0.5203*  0.2223  0.1182  -0.1515  0.2932  -0.0740  -0.0175  -0.0785 
  (0.1215)  (0.1832)  (0.1649)  (0.1730)  (0.2668)  (0.2306)  (0.1695)  (0.2534)  (0.2305)  (0.1632)  (0.2421)  (0.2187) 
56 - 65  0.4875***  0.2604  0.7851***  0.3794*  0.1643  0.7545**  0.4146  0.1617  0.6215  -0.1345  0.0774  -0.4977 
  (0.1679)  (0.2336)  (0.2522)  (0.2210)  (0.3177)  (0.3213)  (0.2539)  (0.3373)  (0.4088)  (0.2195)  (0.2991)  (0.3610) 
Female  0.0387      -0.2256**      0.1790*      0.1368     
  (0.0706)      (0.0992)      (0.0972)      (0.0898)     
Children  -0.3808***  -0.1028  -0.5607***  -0.5196***  -0.0856  -0.6804***  -0.4642***  -0.2240  -0.6501***  0.1549  0.4198***  -0.0777 
  (0.0773)  (0.1181)  (0.1038)  (0.1098)  (0.1667)  (0.1513)  (0.1078)  (0.1625)  (0.1471)  (0.0995)  (0.1485)  (0.1365) 
Intermediate School  -0.0782  -0.0750  -0.0866  -0.0050  0.0647  0.0486  -0.0925  -0.0263  -0.1704  0.0633  -0.0956  0.1559 
  (0.0880)  (0.1353)  (0.1171)  (0.1197)  (0.1835)  (0.1593)  (0.1271)  (0.1926)  (0.1722)  (0.1200)  (0.1774)  (0.1655) 
Upper School  -0.3790***  -0.2689*  -0.4525***  -0.5524***  -0.5721***  -0.4148**  -0.1861  -0.0217  -0.3667*  0.1145  0.0675  0.0675 
  (0.0989)  (0.1454)  (0.1374)  (0.1316)  (0.1921)  (0.1855)  (0.1488)  (0.2279)  (0.2037)  (0.1359)  (0.2022)  (0.1900) 
Vocational Degree  -0.2893***  -0.5179***  -0.0964  -0.1256  -0.2394  -0.0425  -0.1755  -0.4404**  0.0349  -0.0705  -0.1207  -0.0510 
  (0.0842)  (0.1330)  (0.1108)  (0.1231)  (0.2060)  (0.1560)  (0.1162)  (0.1754)  (0.1597)  (0.1037)  (0.1530)  (0.1432) 
College Degree  -0.2617**  -0.3052*  -0.1755  0.1379  0.2345  0.1300  -0.3802**  -0.4058*  -0.3303  -0.2595*  -0.1966  -0.2562 
  (0.1116)  (0.1709)  (0.1498)  (0.1724)  (0.2489)  (0.2320)  (0.1489)  (0.2305)  (0.2011)  (0.1349)  (0.2081)  (0.1799) 
Health                         66 
Ref: Good                         
Normal  -0.5488***  -0.6113***  -0.4803***  -0.5641***  -0.5285***  -0.5242***  -0.4847***  -0.5555***  -0.4687***  -0.0913  -0.3169**  0.0934 
  (0.0815)  (0.1240)  (0.1085)  (0.1150)  (0.1775)  (0.1512)  (0.1131)  (0.1672)  (0.1578)  (0.1022)  (0.1549)  (0.1375) 
Bad  -0.5538***  -0.6497***  -0.4671***  -0.4228***  -0.6583***  -0.1654  -0.9381***  -0.8034**  -1.0743***  -0.6645***  -1.0775***  -0.3467 
  (0.1284)  (0.2030)  (0.1642)  (0.1591)  (0.2453)  (0.2059)  (0.2047)  (0.3313)  (0.2624)  (0.2056)  (0.3565)  (0.2441) 
Household Income  -0.3000***  -0.3232***  -0.3098***  -0.1253  -0.1193  -0.1599  -0.1872**  -0.1764  -0.2239*  0.0867  0.0518  0.0829 
  (0.0583)  (0.0841)  (0.0801)  (0.0769)  (0.1068)  (0.1100)  (0.0907)  (0.1404)  (0.1200)  (0.0867)  (0.1336)  (0.1177) 
German  0.4549***  0.4730**  0.4703**  0.2851  0.0665  0.4879*  0.5416***  0.6940**  0.3783  0.1810  0.2283  0.2070 
  (0.1458)  (0.2194)  (0.1936)  (0.2053)  (0.3457)  (0.2560)  (0.2008)  (0.2693)  (0.3050)  (0.1791)  (0.2331)  (0.2874) 
Unemployment Rate  0.0291  0.0211  0.0436  0.0928  0.1592  0.0417  -0.08 82  -0.1774  -0.0194  0.1117  0.2210**  0.0140 
  (0.0552)  (0.0828)  (0.0743)  (0.0759)  (0.1200)  (0.0979)  (0.0787)  (0.1130)  (0.1094)  (0.0684)  (0.0995)  (0.0955) 
Year 2008  0.0793  -0.0003  0.1635  0.1658  0.2177  0.1227  -0.0186  -0.2504  0.1733  0.2729*  0.2921  0.2302 
  (0.1172)  (0.1783)  (0.1558)  (0.1693)  (0.2755)  (0.2132)  (0.1606)  (0.2336)  (0.2218)  (0.1397)  (0.2170)  (0.1856) 
Overall Life Satisfaction  0.3446***  0.3032***  0.3839***  0.3425***  0.3333***  0.3600***  0.3991***  0.3616***  0.4307***  0.4956***  0.5353***  0.4715*** 
  (0.0224)  (0.0324)  (0.0309)  (0.0297)  (0.0433)  (0.0411)  (0.0343)  (0.0475)  (0.0493)  (0.0327)  (0.0485)  (0.0448) 
Federal States  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant  6.5444***  6.8709***  6.2241***  4.9987***  4.0693**  5.2706***  6.10 70***  6.8888***  5.9717***  1.5065  0.8322  2.4563* 
  (0.7861)  (1.2210)  (1.0345)  (1.0635)  (1.7082)  (1.4012)  (1.1386)  (1.7428)  (1.5072)  (1.0131)  (1.4901)  (1.3693) 
R
2  0.1497  0.1568  0.1647  0.1810  0.2340  0.1766  0.1741  0.1607  0.2104  0.2263  0.2892  0.1909 
adjusted R
2  0.1427  0.1414  0.1529  0.1675  0.2034  0.1541  0.1604  0.1313  0.1865  0.2135  0.2644  0.1664 
F-Test  20.2095  11.0830  12.6462  13.1800  7.6411  7.8580  12.20  6.44  8.45  14.7355  10.7872  6.7153 
Number of Observations  3812  1668  2144  1905  780  1125  1907  888  1019  1907  888  1019 
Number of Individuals  3022  1323  1699  1522  617  905  1757  819  938  1757  819  938 
Notes: OLS, robust standard errors in parentheses, levels of significance ***1%, **5%, *10%, GSOEP (2007-2008). Working Paper Series in Economics 
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